PART ONE: DISPELLING MYTHS ABOUT THE DEFINITION OF 'ATHEISM'
1. First Myth: That 'atheism' refers to the absence of a belief that God exists is just the correct definition of the word, as anyone who studies the issue would know.
Note not only that both sources define 'atheism' as the beilef that there isn't a God, the IEP moreover explicitly notes the distinction between this so-called "positive atheism" and the broader "negative atheism" so as to clearly note that the sense which is widely accepted and which they will use is the narrower "positive atheism". Likewise, it explicitly distinguishes atheism, as the belief that there is no God, from agnosticism, as a state where there is neither the belief that there is a God nor a belief that there isn't.
The same treatment of the issue has been defended by editors of the SEP in response to various emails about the article cited above. Here is part of a response from one of their editors:
Traditionally speaking, the definition in our entry--that 'atheism' means the denial of the existence of God--is correct in the philosophical literature. Some now refer to this standard meaning as "positive atheism" and contrast it with the broader notion of "negative atheism" which has the meaning you suggest--that 'atheism' simply means not-theist.
In our understanding, the argument for this broader notion was introduced into the philosophical literature by Antony Flew in "The Presumption of Atheism" (1972). In that work, he noted that he was using an etymological argument to try to convince people not to follow the standard meaning of the term. His goal was to reframe the debate about the existence of God and to re-brand "atheism" as a default position.
Not everyone has been convinced to use the term in Flew's way simply on the force of his argument. For some, who consider themselves atheists in the traditional sense, Flew's efforts seemed to be an attempt to water down a perfectly good concept. For others, who consider themselves agnostics in the traditional sense, Flew's efforts seemed to be an attempt to re-label them "atheists" -- a term they rejected.
2. Second Myth: That 'atheism' refers to the absence of a belief that God exists is just the correct definition of the word, as anyone who can read a dictionary knows.
This myth appeals to colloquial use in defining the term, as recorded in dictionaries. But the claim here is false. In fact, the vast majority of dictionaries use the "positive atheism" definition defended by the SEP and IEP. Here are examples: Dictionary.com, Merriam-Webster, Cambridge Dictionary, The Free Dictionary, Merriam-Webster Learner's Dictionary, Vocabulary.com, MacMillan Dictionary...The "lack of belief" formulation can be found in a dictionary, but seems to be an idiosyncrasy of Oxford Dictionaries. Note that this is not the canonical "Oxford English Dictionary", which, like the dictionaries listed above, gives the narrower, "positive atheism" definition.
3. Third Myth: That 'atheism' refers to the absence of a belief that God exists is just the correct definition of the word, as it's used by atheists to describe themselves.
The clearest presentation of these issues is in the section called "The Poverty of Agnosticism" (69-77). In this section, Dawkins offers a 7-point scale of religious belief, to describe his understanding of the issue. I'll quote it:
1. Strong theist. 100 per cent probability of God. In the words of C.J. Jung, "I do not believe, I know."Note that Dawkins uses three terms here: 'theist' (positions 1-2), 'agnostic' (3-5), and 'atheist' (6-7). The atheist for Dawkins, whether "de facto" (6) or "strong" (7), is someone who takes it that "God is not there" (6) or that "there is no God" (7). Plainly, this is the same "strong atheism" sense of the term used in the SEP, IEP, and the vast majority of dictionaries. Likewise, Dawkins recognizes positions which lack belief in the existence of God but which are not atheist (3-6), and he distinguishes these positions from atheism by calling them "agnostic".
2. Very high probability but short of 100 per cent. De facto theist. "I cannot know for certain, but I strongly believe in God and live my life on the assumption that he is there."
3. Higher than 50 per cent but not very high. Technically agnostic, but leaning toward theism. "I am very uncertain, but I am inclined to believe in God."
4. Exactly 50 per cent. Completely impartial agnostic. "God's existence and non-existence are exactly equiprobable".
5. Lower than 50 per cent but not very low. Technically agnostic but leaning toward atheism. "I don't know whether God exists but I'm inclined to be skeptical".
6. Very low probability, but short of zero. De facto atheist. "I cannot know for certain but I think God is very improbable, and I live my life on the assumption that he is not here".
7. Strong atheist. "I know there is no God, with the same conviction Jung 'knows' there is one". (73)
Moreover, the entire thesis of this section of the book is a polemic against people who think that we're in a position of merely lacking belief, an error which Dawkins attributes to people not understanding how to reason about probabilities, and which he associates with Huxley's agnosticism--which he critiques on this basis (see especially 72-73). Dawkins counts himself as a "6, but leaning towards 7" (pg. 74), i.e. as an atheist in the narrow, positive sense.
This analysis, distinguishing atheism as the position there there isn't a God from agnosticism as merely lacking a belief either way, and criticizing agnostics (i.e. people who merely lack belief) for not understanding how to reason with probabilities, would become a mainstay of popular atheism following the publication of Dawkins book. Hitchens, for instance, repeatedly gives the exact same account. Here's an example--note Hitchens' conclusion that, in distancing the atheist view from the agnostic one he's criticizing, adopts the "positive atheism" sense of the term (as indeed it must for his criticism of the agnostic to make sense): "The atheist view is there's absolutely no reason ever been advanced by another primate to believe that there is [a God], and when you've got that far, you really ought to say there isn't [a God], not that, for that reason, I'm not sure." (1m52s)
4. Fourth Myth: That 'atheism' refers to the absence of a belief that God exists is just the correct definition of the word, as anyone who studies etymology would know.
There are two problems with this theory. First, our sources for etymology give us a different theory, explaining the original Greek as meaning not without a belief that God exists, but rather "without god" or "ungodliness". Thus the atheist was not everyone but a theist, but rather someone who was profane. And ironically, even a theist could be profane and thus called an atheist--as the early Christians were by the dominant religious tradition of their time.
A second problem with this theory is that the word 'atheism' is the earlier of the two words, appearing in French by the 16th century, following the ancient Greek--whereas 'theist' did not appear until the 17th century, and did not have its current meaning until the 18th.
PART TWO: TWO DIFFERENT KINDS OF DEFINITION WE MIGHT HAVE IN MIND HERE
Stipulative versus Reportive Definitions
At this point it is worthwhile to clarify the distinction between a stipulative and a reportive definition. A stipulativedefinition is where we freely assign a meaning to some variable, in this case a word. This is like in math or programming, if we define, for instance "X=7". Likewise, for ease of communication, we might define "PNC" as "the principle of non-contradiction" or "T2" as "the second thesis defended in Rose's speech". Stipulative definitions can of course involve common words too, as we often see in legal documents: for purposes of this document, "primary manager" shall be defined as "the person who during the shift in question exercises the highest immediate authority of operations in the shipping/receiving department", or what have you. Reportive definitions, conversely, are making a claim about how a word is actually used in some context. For instance, in the previous section I provided some evidence for a reportive definition of 'atheism' in technical writing, popular writing, and popular writing on atheism.
This is an important distinction, because reportive definitions can be disputed--that is, we can argue whether they're true or false--but stipulative definitions can't. In a stipulative definition, there is no question about it's being true or false, since it's simply a freely assigned definition: it can be whatever the definer pleases. It might be misleading orimpractical, but it can't be false.
So there are two different issues here. When people insist that 'atheism' should mean merely the absence of a belief that God exists, do they mean this as a reportive definition, or a stipulative one?
But, as we have seen, they're mistaken if they think the correct reportive definition of the term is the absence of a belief that God exists--this is neither the typical sense in technical writing, nor in popular writing, nor in popular writing specifically about atheism.
So long as such people are willing to give up on the idea that we, Salon, the SEP, etc. are wrong to use the word another way, and they're willing to be clear and consistent in their use of the term, it's of course perfectly correct for them to stipulate this definition of the term in their own use--for, as we've seen, stipulative definitions are never wrong.
Often, when we present people who want to speak this way with the kind of evidence I'm offering in these comments, they object that no one can tell them how to speak. If what they mean is that they're merely stipulating this definition, then they're right, and I hope it's clear that nowhere in these comments am I suggesting anything to the contrary.
But we can ask whether their definition also works as a good reportive definition. It doesn't, as we've seen, and this means at very least (i) that they have to give up on the complaint that everyone else is wrong to use the word any other way, and (ii) that they're speaking in a somewhat misleading way--in general, it's misleading to take common words and then change their meaning, especially when the new meaning is being used in the very same context as the old meaning (which is the case here). In general, we want our language to be clear and accurate, and haphazard changing of definitions is contrary to this goal. Of course, sometimes we have a good reason to change a definition--whether that's the case here will be explored in the next section.
And we can ask how well their definition works on pragmatic terms: does it help clarify the relevant issues, or does it instead obfuscate them? We've already seen one reason to suspect it's a misleading definition, but this is the issue that will be explored next...
One important thing to note when we're defining 'atheism' is that there's a significant difference between someone who believes there is no God, and someone who believes neither this nor that there IS a God. Indeed, this difference turns out to be very important: it's the difference at stake in the Dawkins/Hitchens criticism of Huxley, and of the key error they maintain confuses people into being (on Dawkins'/Hitchens' understanding of the terms) agnostics rather than atheists. Likewise, in the philosophical literature on the existence of God, the most important developments leading us from the theocentric perspective of the medieval period to the non-theistic perspective of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is in the epistemology of Hume and Kant--and what they're saying hinges on the difference between atheism and agnosticism. Huxley himself appeals to Hume and Kant as the key developments leading to agnosticism (see his Agnosticism). Whether it's Hume and Kant, Huxley, or Dawkins and Hitchens, understanding these issues hinges on noting the distinction between atheism, in the "positive atheism" sense, and agnosticism, in the sense of someone who is neither a theist nor an atheist.
Understandably, then, the usual way of using these terms--as we've seen, the way we find in the SEP, IEP, the vast majority of dictionaries, Dawkins' God Delusion, etc.--does a good job here, giving us the language to clearly note this distinction ('atheism' vs. 'agnosticism'). Conversely, if we define 'atheism' as the absence of a belief that God exists, our language does a terrible job here: we've lost the accuracy of our language, and now have only a single word ("atheism") to refer to both of these concepts. This definition fails the test, and that's the first problem, from the pragmatic point of view--it's vague and ambiguous, when we want our language to be clear and precise.
This is an important distinction, because reportive definitions can be disputed--that is, we can argue whether they're true or false--but stipulative definitions can't. In a stipulative definition, there is no question about it's being true or false, since it's simply a freely assigned definition: it can be whatever the definer pleases. It might be misleading orimpractical, but it can't be false.
So there are two different issues here. When people insist that 'atheism' should mean merely the absence of a belief that God exists, do they mean this as a reportive definition, or a stipulative one?
'Atheism' as the absence of a belief that God exists -- a Reportive Definition?
But, as we have seen, they're mistaken if they think the correct reportive definition of the term is the absence of a belief that God exists--this is neither the typical sense in technical writing, nor in popular writing, nor in popular writing specifically about atheism.
'Atheism' as the absence of a belief that God exists -- a Stipulative Definition?
So long as such people are willing to give up on the idea that we, Salon, the SEP, etc. are wrong to use the word another way, and they're willing to be clear and consistent in their use of the term, it's of course perfectly correct for them to stipulate this definition of the term in their own use--for, as we've seen, stipulative definitions are never wrong.
Often, when we present people who want to speak this way with the kind of evidence I'm offering in these comments, they object that no one can tell them how to speak. If what they mean is that they're merely stipulating this definition, then they're right, and I hope it's clear that nowhere in these comments am I suggesting anything to the contrary.
But we can ask whether their definition also works as a good reportive definition. It doesn't, as we've seen, and this means at very least (i) that they have to give up on the complaint that everyone else is wrong to use the word any other way, and (ii) that they're speaking in a somewhat misleading way--in general, it's misleading to take common words and then change their meaning, especially when the new meaning is being used in the very same context as the old meaning (which is the case here). In general, we want our language to be clear and accurate, and haphazard changing of definitions is contrary to this goal. Of course, sometimes we have a good reason to change a definition--whether that's the case here will be explored in the next section.
And we can ask how well their definition works on pragmatic terms: does it help clarify the relevant issues, or does it instead obfuscate them? We've already seen one reason to suspect it's a misleading definition, but this is the issue that will be explored next...
PART THREE: SPEAKING CLEARLY AND THINKING REASONABLY ABOUT ATHEISM
How well does the definition of 'atheism' as the absence of a belief that God exists work on pragmatic terms? Does it help clarify the relevant issues, or does it instead obfuscate them? One issue that we've already seen is that it's a badreportive definition, and this means it might be a somewhat misleading way to speak. But is there nonetheless a good reason to speak this way?'Atheism' as the absence of a belief that God exists -- a vague or imprecise way of speaking
One important thing to note when we're defining 'atheism' is that there's a significant difference between someone who believes there is no God, and someone who believes neither this nor that there IS a God. Indeed, this difference turns out to be very important: it's the difference at stake in the Dawkins/Hitchens criticism of Huxley, and of the key error they maintain confuses people into being (on Dawkins'/Hitchens' understanding of the terms) agnostics rather than atheists. Likewise, in the philosophical literature on the existence of God, the most important developments leading us from the theocentric perspective of the medieval period to the non-theistic perspective of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is in the epistemology of Hume and Kant--and what they're saying hinges on the difference between atheism and agnosticism. Huxley himself appeals to Hume and Kant as the key developments leading to agnosticism (see his Agnosticism). Whether it's Hume and Kant, Huxley, or Dawkins and Hitchens, understanding these issues hinges on noting the distinction between atheism, in the "positive atheism" sense, and agnosticism, in the sense of someone who is neither a theist nor an atheist.
Understandably, then, the usual way of using these terms--as we've seen, the way we find in the SEP, IEP, the vast majority of dictionaries, Dawkins' God Delusion, etc.--does a good job here, giving us the language to clearly note this distinction ('atheism' vs. 'agnosticism'). Conversely, if we define 'atheism' as the absence of a belief that God exists, our language does a terrible job here: we've lost the accuracy of our language, and now have only a single word ("atheism") to refer to both of these concepts. This definition fails the test, and that's the first problem, from the pragmatic point of view--it's vague and ambiguous, when we want our language to be clear and precise.
Why would we resist saying that there is no God?
But one of the things that is motivating this vague language is the feeling that, even if it's vague in this sense, it's more precise in another sense. Its advocates tend to think of it as important to identify not as believing that there is no God, but rather as merely not having a belief that God exists, yet they also want to identify as "atheists", so they naturally resist the idea that an atheist is someone who believes there's no God. But why do they resist claiming that there is no God?
To investigate this, the first thing to do is ask such people (or ask ourselves, if we are such a person): do you think the evidence favors the view that God exists or rather the view that God doesn't exist? We might have varying degrees of certainty about this, so let's use Dawkins' 7-point scale to organize our answer on this question (which is, after all, what it's for). So, someone who thinks there's no more reason to think there is no God than to think there is would be a 4; someone who thinks there's maybe a bit more reason to think there's no God, but it's not enough to be very compelling would be a 5; someone who thinks a rational appraisal of the evidence is going to clearly favor the view that there is no God, though it's not absolutely conclusive would be a 6; and someone who thinks that on the evidence there's just no question at all, it plainly and unqualifiedly shows there is no God would be a 7.
So, which of these views characterizes our individual here--the one who wants to resist saying there's no God, and for this reason resists the definition of 'atheism' found in the SEP, IEP, dictionaries, Dawkins' TGD, etc.? In my experience, they have always been, like Dawkins himself, 6's, perhaps leaning one way or the other. These are not "Teach the Controversy!" people who think the case for God made by the design argument is just as compelling as the case against God, or anything like this. Rather, they think on any rational appraisal, the evidence does favor the view that there is no God.
If that's really our result, than this is helpful. But there's one more question we need to ask to get to bottom of this:do you proportion your beliefs according to the evidence? (That is, if the evidence clearly favors X, do you endeavor for this reason to believe X? Or, would you reject X even though the evidence clearly favors it, out of faith or some other kind of non-rational process?) I expect that our hypothetical person is going to answer yes to this question. If they answer no, then perhaps there's not much point trying to reason with them--since they apparently don't regard reasonas their basis for forming beliefs! But these are not typically faith-based thinkers; they're driven by the evidence, and they're not shy about saying so.
But if this is so, what difficulty could remain? If the evidence favors the view that there is no God, and we believe in proportion with the evidence, then... we should believe there is no God! Why resist this conclusion and insist instead that we merely have no beliefs about God existing?
To investigate this, the first thing to do is ask such people (or ask ourselves, if we are such a person): do you think the evidence favors the view that God exists or rather the view that God doesn't exist? We might have varying degrees of certainty about this, so let's use Dawkins' 7-point scale to organize our answer on this question (which is, after all, what it's for). So, someone who thinks there's no more reason to think there is no God than to think there is would be a 4; someone who thinks there's maybe a bit more reason to think there's no God, but it's not enough to be very compelling would be a 5; someone who thinks a rational appraisal of the evidence is going to clearly favor the view that there is no God, though it's not absolutely conclusive would be a 6; and someone who thinks that on the evidence there's just no question at all, it plainly and unqualifiedly shows there is no God would be a 7.
So, which of these views characterizes our individual here--the one who wants to resist saying there's no God, and for this reason resists the definition of 'atheism' found in the SEP, IEP, dictionaries, Dawkins' TGD, etc.? In my experience, they have always been, like Dawkins himself, 6's, perhaps leaning one way or the other. These are not "Teach the Controversy!" people who think the case for God made by the design argument is just as compelling as the case against God, or anything like this. Rather, they think on any rational appraisal, the evidence does favor the view that there is no God.
If that's really our result, than this is helpful. But there's one more question we need to ask to get to bottom of this:do you proportion your beliefs according to the evidence? (That is, if the evidence clearly favors X, do you endeavor for this reason to believe X? Or, would you reject X even though the evidence clearly favors it, out of faith or some other kind of non-rational process?) I expect that our hypothetical person is going to answer yes to this question. If they answer no, then perhaps there's not much point trying to reason with them--since they apparently don't regard reasonas their basis for forming beliefs! But these are not typically faith-based thinkers; they're driven by the evidence, and they're not shy about saying so.
But if this is so, what difficulty could remain? If the evidence favors the view that there is no God, and we believe in proportion with the evidence, then... we should believe there is no God! Why resist this conclusion and insist instead that we merely have no beliefs about God existing?
It is unreasonable to demand unimpeachable certainty as a condition of believing something
The difficulty turns out to be that some people have somehow got it into their heads that before they believe something they ought to be infallible about it--for otherwise they could be wrong, and that's no basis for believing something. So, at this point they'll say that they resist asserting that there is no God because they could be wrong.
But this is a monstrously strange idea--we don't need infallibility in order to believe something! We don't have infallibility about any scientific claim--neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, for instance--and indeed, the fallibility and corrigibility of scientific claims is one of their impressive features. Or must we resist having any belief one way or another on scientific matters? Must we "Teach the Controversy!"? Surely not: that the evidence is clear enough in supporting (e.g.) the neo-Darwinian synthesis is good enough for us, and if the scientific findings change in the future, we will be happy to correct our views. Surely we recognize it as merely a dirty trick, not a sound maxim of reason, to claim that if science is fallible we must withhold belief in it and give equal recognition to non-scientific alternatives.
But why, then, do we treat the issue of God any differently? If the evidence is clear enough that there is no God, we're just acting confused if we nonetheless resist believing the fact. The matter seems just as Dawkins has said: what seems to be going on here is that people are getting confused about how to reason with probabilities.
So if we're reasoning soundly about evidence clearly favoring the view that there is no God, and speaking clearly about our conclusions, we should not shy from saying that there is no God. And if instead we do shy from this, and limit ourselves to only saying that we have no beliefs about God existing, evidently either we think the evidence fails to favor the view that there is no God, or we're reasoning poorly about the evidence, or we're speaking unclearly about what the evidence says.
SOURCE
But this is a monstrously strange idea--we don't need infallibility in order to believe something! We don't have infallibility about any scientific claim--neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, for instance--and indeed, the fallibility and corrigibility of scientific claims is one of their impressive features. Or must we resist having any belief one way or another on scientific matters? Must we "Teach the Controversy!"? Surely not: that the evidence is clear enough in supporting (e.g.) the neo-Darwinian synthesis is good enough for us, and if the scientific findings change in the future, we will be happy to correct our views. Surely we recognize it as merely a dirty trick, not a sound maxim of reason, to claim that if science is fallible we must withhold belief in it and give equal recognition to non-scientific alternatives.
But why, then, do we treat the issue of God any differently? If the evidence is clear enough that there is no God, we're just acting confused if we nonetheless resist believing the fact. The matter seems just as Dawkins has said: what seems to be going on here is that people are getting confused about how to reason with probabilities.
So if we're reasoning soundly about evidence clearly favoring the view that there is no God, and speaking clearly about our conclusions, we should not shy from saying that there is no God. And if instead we do shy from this, and limit ourselves to only saying that we have no beliefs about God existing, evidently either we think the evidence fails to favor the view that there is no God, or we're reasoning poorly about the evidence, or we're speaking unclearly about what the evidence says.
SOURCE
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