Acknowledgements to Neirdark and Orion for their technical knowledge.
So whats up with MANPADS? That is the question I asked myself as I embarked on this project.
There are many scare stories in the media about airline terrorism. But what does the evidence actually tell us, and perhaps more importantly, what can we gleam from that?
Data and Methodology
As a rule I am only using videos. Twitter updates while interesting, are not proof enough for the issue being addressed. To verify the authenticity of the video, there must be someone in the video actually holding the MANPADS and/or a smoke trail from the missiles being fired. While the self proclaimed ‘Islamic State’ is the only faction in the conflict that has shown the ability to realistically doctor computer generated elements into a video, it is still important to put in safeguards to ensure the videos are legitimate. As you will see in the videos, the presence of backblast from the tubes, and exhaust from the front of the tubes is quite apparent. This effect would be difficult to doctor effectively while still accounting for lighting issues and time of day.
The presence of a shaky camera indicates three things to me.
1) It shows the person with the videocamera is nervous and actually in a battlefield environment. These are not staged battles.
2) It shows that the videographer is there with the MANPADS team, the camera shakes upon firing as the person holding the camera reacts to small explosion taking place in front of them. This is especially apparent in the videos where the videographer is up-close.
3) It shows that the person with the videocamera is more concerned with getting the MANPADS shot on-camera than with manipulating the emotions of the viewer. Often in IS or JaN videos there are establishing shots, jump cuts and other specialized film techniques to make the viewer feel a certain emotion. These videos are not that. They have more in common with viral videos from the mid-2000s in their construction than the high-end propaganda we often associate with the Syrian Civil War.
For the sake of organization, the videos are classified by faction first, description of the video second, rough area inside Syria third, with a rough timestamp fourth.
FSA. Soldier explains how to use SA-7. Unknown Province. November 2012
Unknown Faction. MANPADS used against plane. Idlib. February 2013
FSA. MANPADS used against SAA helicopter. Unknown Province. Early 2013
Unknown Faction. Possible 2nd video of incident above. Ghouta Neighborhood. 2013
FSA. MANPAD shoots down helicopter. Unknown Province. May 2013
Unknown Faction. MANPADS used against plane; improvised battery visible. Unknown Province. May 2014
Ahrar al-Ummah. Two MANPADS used against helicopter. Unknown Province. June 2014
Unknown Faction. Purported Chinese MANPADS used against helicopter. Homs. October 2014
Sham Front. MANPAD used against helicopter. Aleppo Province. September 2015
Yarmouk Army. MANPADS used against aircraft; improvised battery visible. June 2015
The relative dearth and low quality of the videos makes sense in more ways than one. Rebel groups who actually get MANPADS either have to have connections to intelligence services or collect them off of the battlefield (which includes stumbling on them in a warehouse). The groups with ties to intelligence services likely do not want to draw attention to this fact. It may be part of the reason there are so few videos on MANPADS posted online. Videos in the context of the Syrian War have evolved into a form of advertising for different groups. The groups with the flashiest videos get the most recruits and cash from rich Gulf donors. But if you know a guy in an intelligence service who can get you cash and MANPADS, this process can be avoided entirely. No need to draw attention to that.
Rebel groups and militias take time to institute a system of comprehensive disciplinary measures in their ranks. But a logical system of covert action can always be overruled by an overzealous and charming cousin with a cell phone. I call this the “But dude, it’s so cool” factor.
Source of MANPADS
Now that we have proof MANPADS have a measurable presence in Syria, the next question to ask is where the Syrian rebels got these MANPADS? Well, some of them are simply taken from Syria’s stockpiles. Syria has had a long history of arms transfers from Russia and Fmr. Soviet Union.
Surprisingly this seems to be their main supplier. There are no official transfers of shoulder fired anti-aircraft weapons from the usual suspects of unscrupulous arms dealers mainly North Korea, Myanmar, Sudan and Rwanda. This may be of course because they were bought on the greyer side of the international grey market, but based on publicly available data it seems only Russia has supplied shoulder fired anti-aircraft weapons to the SAA. China and Iran have not done so in the past and likely have not done so in the current conflict due to the fact, well none of the rebel factions have a viable air force.
Trade registers show 15,000 Strela 2s/SA-7s were delivered from the Soviet Union between 1970 and 1983. Due to decay of chemicals which charge the SA-7 battery, we see Syrian rebels outright attaching homemade batteries to power their SA-7s. To replace this decaying stockpile, 200 Igla/SA-18s were delivered from the Russian Federation in 2006. With another 200 Igla-S/SA-24 Grinch being delivered between 2008 and 2010. While the SA-7 only locks onto the exhaust of aircraft, the infrared on the SA-18 and SA-24 allows missiles to approach the aircraft from the front and side. Developments in avionics and general design allow the SA-18 and SA-24s to carry heavier payloads than the SA-7. This may explain why a missile only slightly damages an Mi-8 in this video.
So how do Chinese made FN-6s end up on the battlefields of Syria? Here the New York Times comes in handy. We know that Qatar moved at least two batches of MANPADS to Syria. One of these was a shipment of FN-6s. One batch was bought from an “unknown seller” and smuggled to the rebels through Turkey. The other batch was either pilfered directly from a Qaddafi stockpile or bought on the Libyan black market afterwards. Qaddafi though did not hold stocks of FN-6s. Subsequent reporting from the New York Times shows that Ukranian flagged aircraft from an unknown business venture flew military cargo planes from airfields in Khartoum to airfields in Turkey.
China being a major investor in the Sudanese oil market, also has military ties to the government. While we cannot be 100% sure, this seems the most likely explanation for the “unknown seller” reported by the New York Times as well as the source of the FN-6s. But we will very likely never know. When the New York Times contacted Syrian rebels operating MANPADS they noticed the serial numbers and lot numbers had been scratched out and spraypainted over. The rebels say they got them like this.
But Occam’s Razor does not always apply to arms trafficking. The SIPRI data is provided by states, but the exact processes of recording the trade registers and export of weapons will vary dramatically across states and institutions. No one with a functioning brain would actually believe North Korea is honest about what they sell. SIPRI metrics only document full systems, not the accessory pieces. Batteries, gripstocks and eject motors are likely the easy parts to get where as the tubes and missiles would be more difficult for non-state actors to acquire.
The Federation of American Scientists attempted to measure the black market prices of different MANPADS over a 20 year period with success limited to the finding that Stingers are drastically more expensive than their Russian manufactures counterparts. Not that this matter much with ~4000 loose MANPADS (pg. 13) unleashed into Iraq after the disbanding of the Iraqi Army in 2003.
Thanks De-Baathification!
Military Application
Now that we can say with confidence that MANPADS are being used in Syria and how they got there, the next most relevant question is how well are they being used. As alluded to earlier, the answer to this is not very well. The SA-7s, or “Cobras” as the rebels call them, contain batteries that have deteriorated chemically over the past 40 years. This has led individuals to design their own batteries. These are often cumbersome and require a wire to be attached to the system itself. The exact chemicals and structure of the batteries remains outside of the public record, therefore it is unclear how similar the rebel made batteries are to the original design. Some that is available however is that the original battery allowed for one full minute of charge on the MANPADS whereas the rebel made battery only provides charge for somewhere between 30 and 40 seconds.
This has reduced the effectiveness of rebel use of SA-7s since there is less time for both the person using the MANPADS and the MANPADS itself, to orient onto an often fast moving target. For fixed winged aircraft, avoiding MANPADS is relatively easy. Without a capable SAM threats pilots could conceivably just fly out of the range of shoulder fired missiles and drop bombs from that altitude. Considering Assad’s lack of concern for collateral damage this tactic is not out of the question.
For helicopters the MANPADS threat is much more pronounced. This is due to the fact helicopters operate at lower speeds and altitudes than fixed wing aircraft. This opens up opportunities for human operators to spot and lock onto their targets. Helicopters try to reduce this threat by using terrain and buildings as cover. There is a large English language literature on this in the Air-Land-Battle concept of NATO. How these techniques have adapted to the specific dynamics of the Syrian conflict lies outside my realm of expertise.
For a chart showing the capability of different former Soviet Bloc MANPADS, click here
The FN-6 manufactured by the China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Company has a pyramid shaped warhead. This allows for the FN-6 warheads to house a four rather than single unit infrared system. This allows for reduced drag and makes the system easier to identify. It reportedly has a max range of 6000 meters and max altitude of 3,800 meters. It is unknown is Syrian rebels utilize the fact the FN-6 has longer maximum range than the SA-7 (4,200 meters) in planning their operations. An FN-6 is on record was used near Baji to down an Iraqi helicopter.
Global Implications
As the conflict drags on expect the proliferation of a greater number of MANPADS into the Syrian conflict. Whether this happens on a small or large scale is up to state actors to decide. While the TOW program has been successful so far I do not foresee a similar system of video recorded confirmation working for MANPADS. TOWs are not something with a real application to modern urban terrorism. If al-Qaeda or IS got their hands on a TOW the only thing that suffers is an armored vehicle and it’s crew or perhaps an entrenched position. A MANPADS getting loose is a whole different ballgame.
In the post-9/11 environment people often lose perspective on how pervasive airline terrorism was in the 1970s. One of the most erroneous and overlooked examples happened in France. In January of 1975 Carlos the Jackal and operatives of the PFLP were tasked with bringing down an Israelis airliner. The group was able to bring rocket propelled grenades onto the premises of the Orly Airport in France two times within a one week period. The attack against the Israeli airliners failed when the PFLP terrorists miraculously managed to miss their target. While airport security has improved drastically since 9/11 many airports in developing countries still have security measures that could be overcome by a determined actor. Airline terrorism is a real threat, and in a globalized world with increasingly blurry boundaries the threat still exists and should not be discounted by states.
SOURCE
So whats up with MANPADS? That is the question I asked myself as I embarked on this project.
There are many scare stories in the media about airline terrorism. But what does the evidence actually tell us, and perhaps more importantly, what can we gleam from that?
Data and Methodology
As a rule I am only using videos. Twitter updates while interesting, are not proof enough for the issue being addressed. To verify the authenticity of the video, there must be someone in the video actually holding the MANPADS and/or a smoke trail from the missiles being fired. While the self proclaimed ‘Islamic State’ is the only faction in the conflict that has shown the ability to realistically doctor computer generated elements into a video, it is still important to put in safeguards to ensure the videos are legitimate. As you will see in the videos, the presence of backblast from the tubes, and exhaust from the front of the tubes is quite apparent. This effect would be difficult to doctor effectively while still accounting for lighting issues and time of day.
The presence of a shaky camera indicates three things to me.
1) It shows the person with the videocamera is nervous and actually in a battlefield environment. These are not staged battles.
2) It shows that the videographer is there with the MANPADS team, the camera shakes upon firing as the person holding the camera reacts to small explosion taking place in front of them. This is especially apparent in the videos where the videographer is up-close.
3) It shows that the person with the videocamera is more concerned with getting the MANPADS shot on-camera than with manipulating the emotions of the viewer. Often in IS or JaN videos there are establishing shots, jump cuts and other specialized film techniques to make the viewer feel a certain emotion. These videos are not that. They have more in common with viral videos from the mid-2000s in their construction than the high-end propaganda we often associate with the Syrian Civil War.
For the sake of organization, the videos are classified by faction first, description of the video second, rough area inside Syria third, with a rough timestamp fourth.
FSA. Soldier explains how to use SA-7. Unknown Province. November 2012
Unknown Faction. MANPADS used against plane. Idlib. February 2013
FSA. MANPADS used against SAA helicopter. Unknown Province. Early 2013
Unknown Faction. Possible 2nd video of incident above. Ghouta Neighborhood. 2013
FSA. MANPAD shoots down helicopter. Unknown Province. May 2013
Unknown Faction. MANPADS used against plane; improvised battery visible. Unknown Province. May 2014
Ahrar al-Ummah. Two MANPADS used against helicopter. Unknown Province. June 2014
Unknown Faction. Purported Chinese MANPADS used against helicopter. Homs. October 2014
Sham Front. MANPAD used against helicopter. Aleppo Province. September 2015
Yarmouk Army. MANPADS used against aircraft; improvised battery visible. June 2015
The relative dearth and low quality of the videos makes sense in more ways than one. Rebel groups who actually get MANPADS either have to have connections to intelligence services or collect them off of the battlefield (which includes stumbling on them in a warehouse). The groups with ties to intelligence services likely do not want to draw attention to this fact. It may be part of the reason there are so few videos on MANPADS posted online. Videos in the context of the Syrian War have evolved into a form of advertising for different groups. The groups with the flashiest videos get the most recruits and cash from rich Gulf donors. But if you know a guy in an intelligence service who can get you cash and MANPADS, this process can be avoided entirely. No need to draw attention to that.
Rebel groups and militias take time to institute a system of comprehensive disciplinary measures in their ranks. But a logical system of covert action can always be overruled by an overzealous and charming cousin with a cell phone. I call this the “But dude, it’s so cool” factor.
Source of MANPADS
Now that we have proof MANPADS have a measurable presence in Syria, the next question to ask is where the Syrian rebels got these MANPADS? Well, some of them are simply taken from Syria’s stockpiles. Syria has had a long history of arms transfers from Russia and Fmr. Soviet Union.
Surprisingly this seems to be their main supplier. There are no official transfers of shoulder fired anti-aircraft weapons from the usual suspects of unscrupulous arms dealers mainly North Korea, Myanmar, Sudan and Rwanda. This may be of course because they were bought on the greyer side of the international grey market, but based on publicly available data it seems only Russia has supplied shoulder fired anti-aircraft weapons to the SAA. China and Iran have not done so in the past and likely have not done so in the current conflict due to the fact, well none of the rebel factions have a viable air force.
Trade registers show 15,000 Strela 2s/SA-7s were delivered from the Soviet Union between 1970 and 1983. Due to decay of chemicals which charge the SA-7 battery, we see Syrian rebels outright attaching homemade batteries to power their SA-7s. To replace this decaying stockpile, 200 Igla/SA-18s were delivered from the Russian Federation in 2006. With another 200 Igla-S/SA-24 Grinch being delivered between 2008 and 2010. While the SA-7 only locks onto the exhaust of aircraft, the infrared on the SA-18 and SA-24 allows missiles to approach the aircraft from the front and side. Developments in avionics and general design allow the SA-18 and SA-24s to carry heavier payloads than the SA-7. This may explain why a missile only slightly damages an Mi-8 in this video.
So how do Chinese made FN-6s end up on the battlefields of Syria? Here the New York Times comes in handy. We know that Qatar moved at least two batches of MANPADS to Syria. One of these was a shipment of FN-6s. One batch was bought from an “unknown seller” and smuggled to the rebels through Turkey. The other batch was either pilfered directly from a Qaddafi stockpile or bought on the Libyan black market afterwards. Qaddafi though did not hold stocks of FN-6s. Subsequent reporting from the New York Times shows that Ukranian flagged aircraft from an unknown business venture flew military cargo planes from airfields in Khartoum to airfields in Turkey.
China being a major investor in the Sudanese oil market, also has military ties to the government. While we cannot be 100% sure, this seems the most likely explanation for the “unknown seller” reported by the New York Times as well as the source of the FN-6s. But we will very likely never know. When the New York Times contacted Syrian rebels operating MANPADS they noticed the serial numbers and lot numbers had been scratched out and spraypainted over. The rebels say they got them like this.
But Occam’s Razor does not always apply to arms trafficking. The SIPRI data is provided by states, but the exact processes of recording the trade registers and export of weapons will vary dramatically across states and institutions. No one with a functioning brain would actually believe North Korea is honest about what they sell. SIPRI metrics only document full systems, not the accessory pieces. Batteries, gripstocks and eject motors are likely the easy parts to get where as the tubes and missiles would be more difficult for non-state actors to acquire.
The Federation of American Scientists attempted to measure the black market prices of different MANPADS over a 20 year period with success limited to the finding that Stingers are drastically more expensive than their Russian manufactures counterparts. Not that this matter much with ~4000 loose MANPADS (pg. 13) unleashed into Iraq after the disbanding of the Iraqi Army in 2003.
Thanks De-Baathification!
Military Application
Now that we can say with confidence that MANPADS are being used in Syria and how they got there, the next most relevant question is how well are they being used. As alluded to earlier, the answer to this is not very well. The SA-7s, or “Cobras” as the rebels call them, contain batteries that have deteriorated chemically over the past 40 years. This has led individuals to design their own batteries. These are often cumbersome and require a wire to be attached to the system itself. The exact chemicals and structure of the batteries remains outside of the public record, therefore it is unclear how similar the rebel made batteries are to the original design. Some that is available however is that the original battery allowed for one full minute of charge on the MANPADS whereas the rebel made battery only provides charge for somewhere between 30 and 40 seconds.
This has reduced the effectiveness of rebel use of SA-7s since there is less time for both the person using the MANPADS and the MANPADS itself, to orient onto an often fast moving target. For fixed winged aircraft, avoiding MANPADS is relatively easy. Without a capable SAM threats pilots could conceivably just fly out of the range of shoulder fired missiles and drop bombs from that altitude. Considering Assad’s lack of concern for collateral damage this tactic is not out of the question.
For helicopters the MANPADS threat is much more pronounced. This is due to the fact helicopters operate at lower speeds and altitudes than fixed wing aircraft. This opens up opportunities for human operators to spot and lock onto their targets. Helicopters try to reduce this threat by using terrain and buildings as cover. There is a large English language literature on this in the Air-Land-Battle concept of NATO. How these techniques have adapted to the specific dynamics of the Syrian conflict lies outside my realm of expertise.
For a chart showing the capability of different former Soviet Bloc MANPADS, click here
The FN-6 manufactured by the China National Precision Machinery Import and Export Company has a pyramid shaped warhead. This allows for the FN-6 warheads to house a four rather than single unit infrared system. This allows for reduced drag and makes the system easier to identify. It reportedly has a max range of 6000 meters and max altitude of 3,800 meters. It is unknown is Syrian rebels utilize the fact the FN-6 has longer maximum range than the SA-7 (4,200 meters) in planning their operations. An FN-6 is on record was used near Baji to down an Iraqi helicopter.
Global Implications
As the conflict drags on expect the proliferation of a greater number of MANPADS into the Syrian conflict. Whether this happens on a small or large scale is up to state actors to decide. While the TOW program has been successful so far I do not foresee a similar system of video recorded confirmation working for MANPADS. TOWs are not something with a real application to modern urban terrorism. If al-Qaeda or IS got their hands on a TOW the only thing that suffers is an armored vehicle and it’s crew or perhaps an entrenched position. A MANPADS getting loose is a whole different ballgame.
In the post-9/11 environment people often lose perspective on how pervasive airline terrorism was in the 1970s. One of the most erroneous and overlooked examples happened in France. In January of 1975 Carlos the Jackal and operatives of the PFLP were tasked with bringing down an Israelis airliner. The group was able to bring rocket propelled grenades onto the premises of the Orly Airport in France two times within a one week period. The attack against the Israeli airliners failed when the PFLP terrorists miraculously managed to miss their target. While airport security has improved drastically since 9/11 many airports in developing countries still have security measures that could be overcome by a determined actor. Airline terrorism is a real threat, and in a globalized world with increasingly blurry boundaries the threat still exists and should not be discounted by states.
SOURCE
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