Historical Overview of the Gulf War 1991
In July 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, its oil rich neighbor to the South. Kuwait was a small country that could not stand up to the might of Iraq’s 500,000 man army. As such, Iraq occupied Kuwait with complete ease and embarked on a campaign of raping and pillaging in Kuwait City. This invasion sparked international outrage and led to the creation of a UN Coalition to oust Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army from Kuwait.1
The Coalition was led by the United States with Britain, France, and other Arab states participating. When Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw his forces from Kuwait, the United States started at buildup of its forces along the Kuwaiti border in Saudi Arabia, codenamed Desert Shield. Originally, the U.S. had the goal of liberating Kuwait, but policymakers in Washington decided also on a strategic goal of ousting Saddam Hussein from power. By January 1991, the buildup was complete, with its forces led by General Norman Schwarzkopf. With this, the offensive operation, codenamed Desert Storm, began.
The Air War
On January 17th, the United States launched a massive aerial bombardment campaign through Iraq, striking Iraq’s air defense installations as well as Iraqi troop movements. This air campaign lasted for over a month, concluded near the end of February, and was massively successful. The Iraqi Air Force and air defense was completely annihilated.2 Iraqi ground forces were bloodied by the aerial bombardment, as shown by one rattled member of Iraq’s 5th Mechanized Division reporting that “American airpower had done more damage to his brigade in half an hour than it had suffered in eight years of fighting the Iranians.”3
The Ground War
After the conclusion of the air campaign, Coalition ground forces conducted an offensive against the Iraqi Army on February 26th, 1991.4 The operational plan was this: U.S. Marines and the British 1st Armoured Division would frontally attack Iraqi forces in Kuwait to pin them down. Meanwhile, the US VII Corps would attack through the Western Iraqi desert in a flanking maneuver to strike deep into Iraqi lines and cut off their avenues of retreat and supply. The French and the US 82nd Airborne Division would attack northeast on the VII Corps’ left in a flank guard action. This pincer movement was to be completed at the Rumaila oil fields with the Army’s VII Corps linking up with the Marines in a complete encirclement of Iraqi forces. This plan is shown by this battle map.
The execution of the plan was sloppy, but mostly successful. The weakened Iraqi Army and even the fanatical Republican Guard crumbled before Coalition forces. The VII Corps dash through the desert was a resounding success, destroying all Iraqi forces in its path and penetrating into the Iraqi rear.
However, at the Battle of 73 Easting, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment ran into the Republican Guard’s Tawalkana Division and the Iraqi 12th Armored Division in defensive positions guarding the entire Army’s supply route. American forces pushed through the initial defenses, but faced heavy counterattacks by both the aforementioned Iraqi units. These attacks were repulsed by the crushing firepower of the 2nd ACR’s Abrams tanks and American fire support. At the end of the battle an entire brigade of the Tawalkana Division and most of the 12th Armored were destroyed.5
However, at the same time, pinning attack in Kuwait was so resoundingly successful that the Marines pushed too far, too fast in to Kuwait, thereby forcing the Iraqis to flee in retreat before VII Corps could close the trap. After a 100 hours of fierce fighting on the ground and the ejection of Iraq’s military from Kuwait, American civilian leadership called for a halt to all offensive operations.6
Tactical and Operational Successes
The stream of battlefield victories like the Battle of 73 Easting showcased the fighting prowess of the post-Vietnam U.S. Army. U.S. forces had completely defeated the Iraqi Army and the vaunted Republican Guard. As such, Kuwait was liberated and the Iraqi military was massively weakened.
Operational Failures
However, the failure of the Coalition to close the encirclement of Iraqi forces led to the escape of an estimated “one-third [to] one-half of the Republican Guard.”7 This sole operational failure would contribute to a large strategic failure.
A Strategic Failure in the Aftermath of Military Victory
In the aftermath of Desert Storm, the Iraqi military still possessed a potent amount of combat power for internal police actions, including tanks, IFVs, and attack helicopters. General Norman Schwarzkopf in his ceasefire negotiation with the Iraqis, established a no-fly zone over all of Iraq, but exempted helicopters, including attack helicopters.8
In the meantime, American strategic thinkers stateside thought that the weak link in Iraq was Saddam Hussein’s political apparatus. They foolishly thought that his military defeat not only weakened his regime, but also effectively destroyed his army. As such, they encouraged Iraq’s oppressed Shia and Kurdish minorities to stage a revolution against Saddam and overthrow him.9
In conjunction with American encouragement and supposed backing, the minorities launched an open rebellion. However, as previously stated, the Republican Guard was still alive and kicking. Their attack helicopters and tanks played a crucial role in the brutal suppression of the Shia rebellion, resulting in the massacre of men, women, and children alike. These events ironically strengthened Saddam’s grip on the Iraqi populace.10
Moreover, while the air campaign was a mostly a success, the month long bombardment alerted Saddam Hussein to impending American attack. As such, when the push into Kuwait came, he was able to torch some Kuwaiti oil fields, rendering parts of it useless to a liberated Kuwait.
As a result, while the immediate goal of liberating Kuwait was a resounding success, the strategic goal of deposing Saddam Hussein was a complete failure. As such, he remained a thorn in America’s side and contributed heavily to the quagmire that was Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.
Conclusion
Operation Desert Storm was undeniably a huge military victory. 100 Hours of ground combat defeated one of the most powerful countries in the Mid-East. However, operational mistakes that allowed for much of the Republican Guard to slip the noose of encirclement and strategic missteps by Washington led to strategic disaster. Major General Robert H. Scales as a co-author to the book The Iraq War, wrote
In July 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, its oil rich neighbor to the South. Kuwait was a small country that could not stand up to the might of Iraq’s 500,000 man army. As such, Iraq occupied Kuwait with complete ease and embarked on a campaign of raping and pillaging in Kuwait City. This invasion sparked international outrage and led to the creation of a UN Coalition to oust Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army from Kuwait.1
The Coalition was led by the United States with Britain, France, and other Arab states participating. When Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw his forces from Kuwait, the United States started at buildup of its forces along the Kuwaiti border in Saudi Arabia, codenamed Desert Shield. Originally, the U.S. had the goal of liberating Kuwait, but policymakers in Washington decided also on a strategic goal of ousting Saddam Hussein from power. By January 1991, the buildup was complete, with its forces led by General Norman Schwarzkopf. With this, the offensive operation, codenamed Desert Storm, began.
The Air War
On January 17th, the United States launched a massive aerial bombardment campaign through Iraq, striking Iraq’s air defense installations as well as Iraqi troop movements. This air campaign lasted for over a month, concluded near the end of February, and was massively successful. The Iraqi Air Force and air defense was completely annihilated.2 Iraqi ground forces were bloodied by the aerial bombardment, as shown by one rattled member of Iraq’s 5th Mechanized Division reporting that “American airpower had done more damage to his brigade in half an hour than it had suffered in eight years of fighting the Iranians.”3
The Ground War
After the conclusion of the air campaign, Coalition ground forces conducted an offensive against the Iraqi Army on February 26th, 1991.4 The operational plan was this: U.S. Marines and the British 1st Armoured Division would frontally attack Iraqi forces in Kuwait to pin them down. Meanwhile, the US VII Corps would attack through the Western Iraqi desert in a flanking maneuver to strike deep into Iraqi lines and cut off their avenues of retreat and supply. The French and the US 82nd Airborne Division would attack northeast on the VII Corps’ left in a flank guard action. This pincer movement was to be completed at the Rumaila oil fields with the Army’s VII Corps linking up with the Marines in a complete encirclement of Iraqi forces. This plan is shown by this battle map.
The execution of the plan was sloppy, but mostly successful. The weakened Iraqi Army and even the fanatical Republican Guard crumbled before Coalition forces. The VII Corps dash through the desert was a resounding success, destroying all Iraqi forces in its path and penetrating into the Iraqi rear.
However, at the Battle of 73 Easting, the 2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment ran into the Republican Guard’s Tawalkana Division and the Iraqi 12th Armored Division in defensive positions guarding the entire Army’s supply route. American forces pushed through the initial defenses, but faced heavy counterattacks by both the aforementioned Iraqi units. These attacks were repulsed by the crushing firepower of the 2nd ACR’s Abrams tanks and American fire support. At the end of the battle an entire brigade of the Tawalkana Division and most of the 12th Armored were destroyed.5
However, at the same time, pinning attack in Kuwait was so resoundingly successful that the Marines pushed too far, too fast in to Kuwait, thereby forcing the Iraqis to flee in retreat before VII Corps could close the trap. After a 100 hours of fierce fighting on the ground and the ejection of Iraq’s military from Kuwait, American civilian leadership called for a halt to all offensive operations.6
Tactical and Operational Successes
The stream of battlefield victories like the Battle of 73 Easting showcased the fighting prowess of the post-Vietnam U.S. Army. U.S. forces had completely defeated the Iraqi Army and the vaunted Republican Guard. As such, Kuwait was liberated and the Iraqi military was massively weakened.
Operational Failures
However, the failure of the Coalition to close the encirclement of Iraqi forces led to the escape of an estimated “one-third [to] one-half of the Republican Guard.”7 This sole operational failure would contribute to a large strategic failure.
A Strategic Failure in the Aftermath of Military Victory
In the aftermath of Desert Storm, the Iraqi military still possessed a potent amount of combat power for internal police actions, including tanks, IFVs, and attack helicopters. General Norman Schwarzkopf in his ceasefire negotiation with the Iraqis, established a no-fly zone over all of Iraq, but exempted helicopters, including attack helicopters.8
In the meantime, American strategic thinkers stateside thought that the weak link in Iraq was Saddam Hussein’s political apparatus. They foolishly thought that his military defeat not only weakened his regime, but also effectively destroyed his army. As such, they encouraged Iraq’s oppressed Shia and Kurdish minorities to stage a revolution against Saddam and overthrow him.9
In conjunction with American encouragement and supposed backing, the minorities launched an open rebellion. However, as previously stated, the Republican Guard was still alive and kicking. Their attack helicopters and tanks played a crucial role in the brutal suppression of the Shia rebellion, resulting in the massacre of men, women, and children alike. These events ironically strengthened Saddam’s grip on the Iraqi populace.10
Moreover, while the air campaign was a mostly a success, the month long bombardment alerted Saddam Hussein to impending American attack. As such, when the push into Kuwait came, he was able to torch some Kuwaiti oil fields, rendering parts of it useless to a liberated Kuwait.
As a result, while the immediate goal of liberating Kuwait was a resounding success, the strategic goal of deposing Saddam Hussein was a complete failure. As such, he remained a thorn in America’s side and contributed heavily to the quagmire that was Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.
Conclusion
Operation Desert Storm was undeniably a huge military victory. 100 Hours of ground combat defeated one of the most powerful countries in the Mid-East. However, operational mistakes that allowed for much of the Republican Guard to slip the noose of encirclement and strategic missteps by Washington led to strategic disaster. Major General Robert H. Scales as a co-author to the book The Iraq War, wrote
No matter how impressive the battlefield victories might have appeared ... the United States failed to win the peace.11Endnotes:
- Williamson Murray and Robert H. Scales, The Iraq War: A Military History (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003), 30.
- Ibid, 4.
- Thomas E Ricks, The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today (New York: Penguin Books, 2012), 377.
- Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 4.
- Ibid, 5-7.
- Ricks, The Generals, 381.
- Ibid, 382.
- Ibid, 382-383.
- Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, 9.
- Ibid, 9-10.
- Ibid, 8.
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